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INTRODUCTION 
It hardly needs saying that summary judgment has been a controversial 
topic. The device was, by many accounts, long a sleepy backwater of the 
procedural countryside. To that effect, it is fitting, at the seventy-fifth 
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anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to take note of Judge 
Charles Clark’s pushback in the 1950s against the suggestion that summary 
judgment was inherently problematic. Conceding that “[i]t is obvious that 
judges should be careful not to grant judgment against one who shows a 
genuine issue as to a material fact,” Judge Clark went on to write, 
Just as obvious is the obligation to examine a case with care to see that a 
trial is not forced upon a litigant by one with no case at all. The very freedom 
permitted by the simplified pleadings of the modern practice is subject to 
abuse unless it is checked by the devices looking to the summary disclosure 
of the merits if the case is to continue to trial. Those are discovery, summary 
judgment, and pre-trial—all necessary correlatives of each other and of a 
system which may permit concealment of the weakness of a case in the 
generalized pleadings of the present day. Refusal of summary disposal of 
the case may be a real hardship on the more deserving of the litigants. . . . A 
court has failed in granting justice when it forces a party to an expensive 
trial of several weeks’ duration to meet purely formal allegations without 
substance fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear a case at all.1 
An oft-told story takes off from there with either a grim or grinning 
citation to the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy.2 In one telling of this story, 
the Court paved paradise and put up a parking lot of pretrial disposition 
that unfairly and unreasonably burdens plaintiffs3—perhaps even violating 
the right to a civil jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment.4  
 
1 Charles E. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 578 (1952). 
2 Echoing Judge Clark, the Court stated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,  
[W]ith the advent of “notice pleading,” the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function 
any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Rule 56 
must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims 
and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to 
a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate 
in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no 
factual basis. 
477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“[T]he 
trial judge’s summary judgment inquiry as to whether a genuine issue exists will be whether the 
evidence presented is such that a jury applying that evidentiary standard could reasonably find for 
either the plaintiff or the defendant.”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that a nonmoving party opposing summary judgment must come 
forward with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue and “must do more than simply show 
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). 
3 For an encyclopedic and widely cited discussion of the burdens imposed on plaintiffs, see 
generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 982 (2003). For a practitioner’s similar argument that “[t]he Court has transformed summary 
judgment from a device limited to ascertaining whether there is any dispute about what the truth 
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As litigation has more than one side, there is, of course, an opposing 
view—namely that invigorated summary judgment practice simply and 
efficiently substitutes an early dispositive motion for the substantial and 
pointless costs of going through the trial motions in a meritless suit.5 But 
even this positive position concerning efficiency has been contested. As 
Samuel Issacharoff and George Loewenstein have suggested, liberalized 
summary judgment practice might affect the parties’ returns from settlement 
in cases that otherwise would settle early in the litigation process.6 If 
liberalized summary judgment eliminates enough early settlements, then it 
might actually increase the net costs of administering the federal civil 
justice system: even if fewer cases get past summary judgment, perhaps 
more cases get to summary judgment. One scholar has even asserted that, as 
a practical matter, the costs of civil litigation would fall if we abolished 
summary judgment altogether.7 
 
is to a trial on the merits by paper,” see Richard L. Steagall, The Recent Explosion in Summary 
Judgments Entered by the Federal Courts Has Eliminated the Jury from the Judicial Power, 33 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 469, 470 (2009); see also John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
522, 527-30 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is costly because it discourages early 
settlement and thus requires parties to go through pretrial litigation). 
4 For an extended argument that summary judgment is and has always been unconstitutional, 
see generally Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 
(2007). 
5 See generally Edward Brunet, Essay, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 689 (2012) (proposing that summary judgment has several efficient effects, including fact 
clarification, early legal analysis, formal pretrial assessment of a case’s strength, and a “settlement 
premium” that nonmoving parties gain when a motion for summary judgment is dismissed). 
6 Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 
YALE L.J. 73, 100-03 (1990). Issacharoff and Loewenstein also point out that liberalized summary 
judgment may “inhibit[] the filing of otherwise meritorious suits and result[] in a wealth transfer 
from plaintiffs as a class to defendants as a class.” Id. at 75. This latter conclusion, of course, would 
not necessarily hold true if some plaintiffs could expect to benefit from liberalized summary 
judgment practice. Based on an empirical analysis of all federal court opinions citing to Celotex 
published in the first quarter of 1988 in which only one party moved for summary judgment, 
Issacharoff and Loewenstein determined that “[s]ummary judgment is a defendant’s motion. Of 
the 140 motions, 122 were made by defendants and 18 by plaintiffs.” Id. at 91-92. For criticism of 
such reliance on published opinions, see Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary 
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 591, 603-05 (2004), and Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice 
in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861, 869-70 (2007). For evidence that 
in some types of cases filed through 2006, defendants filed the overwhelming share of summary 
judgment motions, whereas in other types of cases, the filing of such motions was more balanced 
between plaintiffs and defendants, see Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial 
Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson 6 tbl.1 (Aug. 13, 2008) [hereinafter Cecil & Cort Memorandum], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf. 
7 See Bronsteen, supra note 3, at 532-36. 
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For much of the two decades or so following the 1986 trilogy, a powerful 
narrative held that these decisions importantly affected not only summary 
judgment doctrine but also the facts on the ground in litigation. The 
narrative of sudden change sparked by the 1986 trilogy has commanded 
support from some noted scholars over the years,8 perhaps reinforced by 
normative concerns regarding constitutionality, fairness, and access to 
justice. The flame of these normative concerns was only fanned by the 
Supreme Court’s much more recent—and hardly less controversial—
intervention into pleading doctrine in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly9 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.10 No doubt the oft-repeated, positive view that the trilogy 
loosed the hounds of pretrial disposition fits snugly into the dim-view 
normative zeitgeist that has sunk roots following Twombly and Iqbal.11 
But this is not the only story about the development of summary judgment 
practice over the last several decades. Roughly a decade ago, after considering 
the then-existing empirical literature, as well as his own examination of 
docket information from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Stephen 
Burbank wrote that “[s]uch reliable empirical evidence as we have, however, 
does not support the claims of those who see a turning point in the Supreme 
 
8 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 1044-45 & nn.334-36 (noting that scholars Martin B. Louis, 
Paul Carrington, and John P. Frank all favor the Supreme Court’s trilogy); Martin H. Redish, 
Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1329, 1333 (2005) (arguing that “it is not unreasonable to suspect that one of the primary contributors 
to [the reduction in the number of trials at the federal level] has been the Supreme Court’s 
substantial modification and expansion of the modern doctrine of summary judgment”).  
9 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
10 556 U.S. 662 (2009). It is an interesting question—and, to my knowledge, one that has not 
yet been answered—whether the advent of “plausibility pleading” should alter the balance struck 
between defendant-movants and plaintiff-respondents at summary judgment. Certainly such an 
alteration would be the logical and symmetrical result of Justice Rehnquist’s musing in Celotex on 
the relationship between the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (“Before the shift to ‘notice pleading’ accompanied by the Federal Rules, 
motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually 
insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial . . . . [T]he 
motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function anymore, and its place has been taken by the motion 
for summary judgment.”).  
11 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 1044-46 (noting that, while some scholars have supported 
the effects of the trilogy on pretrial disposition, other scholars assert that judges now function as 
“pretrial factfinders” and therefore overstep the boundaries between judges and juries). See 
generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate 
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (2010) 
(contending that Twombly and Iqbal altered litigation practices so that fewer civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases are filed, while a greater number of the same types of cases are 
dismissed). 
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Court’s 1986 trilogy. Rather, that evidence suggests that summary judgment 
started to assume a greater role in the 1970s.”12  
Joe Cecil of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) later led a team of authors 
to analyze data on summary judgment activity for six time periods in six 
U.S. district courts.13 Cecil’s team, echoing Burbank’s conclusion, found that 
“when different levels of summary judgment activity across courts and the 
changing nature of the federal caseload are taken into consideration, the 
likelihood of one or more summary judgment motions being filed began to 
increase before the trilogy.”14 They went on to suggest that the increased 
disposition of cases on summary judgment motions might simply be 
attributable to an increase in the relative number of civil rights cases, for 
which summary judgment—in terms of both the number of motions and the 
number of dispositions—had always been more prevalent.15  
On the trilogy’s twenty-fifth anniversary, Linda Mullenix revisited the 
work of Cecil and his coauthors, concluding that “[a]rguably, the summary 
judgment trilogy had its greatest impact on the way in which first-year civil 
procedure professors teach summary judgment.”16 Mullenix conducted her 
own empirical study of 222 published and unpublished Circuit Court of 
Appeals decisions from 2010 in which the appellate court was reviewing 
district court summary judgment decisions.17 She found, in brief, that courts 
often did not cite Celotex.18 Moreover, “[i]f this were not shocking enough, 
in the remaining universe of decisions where courts do cite Celotex, some 
federal judges do not seem to acknowledge, understand, or apply the 
elaborate Celotex conceptual framework.”19 Finally, Mullenix found that, 
even after Celotex, many federal judges continued to use “a kind-of gestalt 
‘tennis match’ mode of analysis” to decide summary judgment motions.20 
Combining her findings regarding Celotex with evidence that neither 
Anderson nor Matsushita had much impact, Mullenix concluded that the 
trilogy may in fact have been “much ado about very little” and that attorneys 
 
12 Burbank, supra note 6, at 620. 
13 Cecil et al., supra note 6, at 861. 
14 Id. at 863.  
15 Id. at 905-06. 
16 Linda S. Mullenix, The 25th Anniversary of the Summary Judgment Trilogy: Much Ado About 
Very Little, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 561, 562 (2012). Mullenix began her article with the equally 
provocative suggestion that the trilogy’s anniversary “provide[d] an excellent opportunity to 
reflect on the legal profession’s ability to overstate, overhype, and overinflate the impact of 
Supreme Court decisions.” Id. at 561. 
17 Id. at 567. 
18 Id. at 568. 
19 Id. at 584. 
20 Id. 
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“need not overly fret over” the details of summary judgment motion 
practice.21 
Doctrinal issues related to summary judgment surely need no further 
development in the wake of the flood of scholarship following the trilogy.22 
Nor is there any sense in presenting yet more evidence concerning how 
trends in summary judgment disposition relate to the trilogy. As to this 
aspect of empirical work related to summary judgment, I agree heartily with 
Mullenix’s position that “[t]he FJC has preempted and occupied the entire 
field of empirical study of summary judgment in the post-Celotex era.”23 
Instead, this Article will pursue two distinct objectives. In Part I, I consider 
the empirical implications of perceived changes in judges’ adjudicatory 
practices at summary judgment. I suggest that empirical evidence concerning 
summary judgment disposition should be considered in the light cast by 
behavioral models of party behavior that take seriously the fact that litigation 
involves live parties—who, together with their attorneys, make deliberate, 
strategic decisions—rather than inanimate particles bouncing around and 
filing motions exogenously. To give this sort of life to both parties, one must 
reject the notion that cases will always be litigated in one way or another, 
regardless of the legal rules and judicial environment that litigants face. 
Since I doubt that anyone holds such a Calvinist view of litigation behavior, 
my discussion in Part I is best viewed as indicating the methodological 
implications of accepting at least some role of free will in litigation. As it 
turns out, litigants’ ability to carefully consider how to respond to changes 
in summary judgment standards24—for example, by choosing to file motions 
 
21 Id. 
22 For a particularly insightful discussion about the impact of the trilogy on federal court 
summary judgment motions, see Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering 
Summary Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006). 
That summary judgment doctrinal issues do not need further development in light of the 
scholarship surrounding the trilogy remains true even considering Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 
(2007), in which the Court found the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and granted 
summary judgment, relying in large part on a video recording of a police-involved car chase that 
contradicted the plaintiff ’s promised testimony. There is no shortage of controversy concerning 
Scott. Compare Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837 (2009) (suggesting the Court’s reasoning 
concerning societal risk was reflective of cognitive illiberalism bias and that the Court’s opinion 
was therefore illegitimate), with Christopher Slobogin, The Perils of the Fight Against Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 1 (2009) (disagreeing with the premise proposed by Kahan and 
his coauthors and rejecting their analysis as misguided). Though highly controversial, Scott’s 
ground is well enough trod that there seems little point in my tramping it any further here. 
23 Mullenix, supra note 16, at 566. 
24 In this Article, I use the term “summary judgment standard” not in a black-letter sense, 
but rather more broadly, as a way to capture any change in the probability that the judge would 
grant a particular motion filed in a particular case. 
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they would not have filed under an earlier summary judgment standard or 
to relax settlement demands under their opponents’ threat to move for 
summary judgment—has important implications for the interpretation of 
empirical evidence concerning changes in summary judgment disposition 
over time, including the evidence already discussed.  
In Part II, I discuss some of the empirical implications of Part I’s analytical 
machinery, concentrating on what this equipment might suggest about the 
relationship between judge characteristics and observed summary judgment 
motion–filing behavior, given that parties might settle before either moves 
for summary judgment.  
In Part III, I present empirical results that relate the filing of summary 
judgment motions directly to judge characteristics.25 All cases in my data set 
were filed in the 2005 calendar year, which, of course, long postdates the 
trilogy. But the characteristics of the district court judges to whom cases are 
assigned differ substantially, and various arguments in the literature suggest 
the possibility that certain judge characteristics—namely, sex, race, ethnicity, 
and appointing President—should make some judges more favorable to 
defendants than other judges.  
Because defendants file the vast majority of summary judgment motions 
in civil rights and torts cases,26 it is possible to test the notion that plaintiffs 
do not respond to summary judgment standards by determining whether 
cases assigned to judges with more defendant-favorable characteristics are 
more likely to have summary judgment motions filed. I find significant 
evidence that judge characteristics are associated with summary judgment 
motion filing in civil rights cases, but the pattern of estimated effects does 
not look like what one would expect in a world in which only defendants 
react strategically to judge characteristics. And for tort cases, one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that judge characteristics are irrelevant to whether a 
summary judgment motion is ever filed. An alternative explanation might be 
that neither plaintiffs nor defendants make motion-filing decisions strategically 
in tort cases.27 But what theory would explain why parties respond to judge 
characteristics in civil rights cases but not in tort cases?  
Finally, in Part IV, I offer some thoughts about the normative implications 
of my analysis and empirical results. 
 
25 Yale Law School’s Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund generously provided the grant that funded 
this project. I submitted this grant together with William N. Eskridge, Jr., John A. Garver 
Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School. 
26 Cecil & Cort Memorandum, supra note 6, at 6 tbl.1. 
27 More likely is the possibility that the bilateral nature of settlement decisions and litigants’ 
settlement choices obscures the effects of judge characteristics on each party’s strategic calculations. 
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I. LIVE PARTIES AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
In this Part, I adapt arguments I made in previous works concerning 
Twombly, Iqbal, and Rule 12(b)(6) motions.28 At the motion to dismiss stage, 
as in the summary judgment context, one can expect parties to adapt their 
behavior to perceived changes in legal rules. Such adaptations can have 
empirical implications that would otherwise seem counterintuitive. For 
convenience, I assume that only the defendant may file a summary judgment 
motion. I later discuss how certain aspects of the model might change when 
one considers that both parties may so move. Little is lost, however, by not 
providing for plaintiff-filed summary judgment motions in the model. For 
civil rights and tort cases, the assumption that only defendants file summary 
judgment motions is a reasonable empirical approximation. Also, my 
intuition is that modeling the fact that plaintiffs may file summary judgment 
motions would further complicate matters, thereby making it even easier to 
obtain the anything-goes results derived below. 
Consider “judicial behavior effects.” These effects involve changes in the 
way a judge would adjudicate a summary judgment motion, if filed, in a 
case. Just as many participants in the debate over pleading have interpreted 
changes in the Rule 12(b)(6) grant rate as capturing the average judicial 
behavior effect across cases facing Rule 12(b)(6) motions, participants in the 
empirical debate concerning summary judgment have generally interpreted 
the change in the summary judgment disposition rate as capturing the 
trilogy-induced judicial behavior effect at the summary judgment stage. 
In addition to judicial behavior effects, there are three other types of 
effects to consider. First, the “defendant selection effect” refers to cases that 
defendants would not challenge under a demanding summary judgment 
burden of production but would so challenge under an easier burden. 
Defendant selection can therefore be expected to systematically draw into 
summary judgment adjudication cases in which evidence more strongly 
favors the plaintiff. Consequently, we should expect defendant selection to 
reduce the summary judgment disposition rate. As such, if defendant 
selection were the only type of party selection happening in federal cases, a 
finding that the summary judgment disposition rate had not fallen post-
 
28 See generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of 
Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270 (2012) (estimating nontrivial 
negative effects on plaintiffs as a result of Twombly and Iqbal); Jonah B. Gelbach, Selection in 
Motion: A Formal Model of Rule 12(b)(6) and the Twombly-Iqbal Shift in Pleading Policy (Aug. 
29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2138428 (applying a game-theoretic model to analyze the effects of a more demanding pleading 
standard).  
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trilogy could be explained only by a shift favoring defendants in summary 
judgment adjudication. 
Second, the “plaintiff selection effect” accounts for plaintiffs’ decisions 
not to file suit in the first place. This effect occurs because some plaintiffs 
will expect to face summary judgment motions under the new summary 
judgment standard, whereas they would not expect defendants to file such 
motions under the earlier standard. The combination of the added costs of 
opposing the summary judgment motion and the risk that it will be granted 
can sufficiently reduce the expected value of litigation such that the plaintiff 
might decide to forgo filing the suit altogether.29 Plaintiff selection effects 
also occur in another set of cases. Consider cases in which plaintiffs would 
expect to face summary judgment motions under either summary judgment 
practice. In some of these cases, plaintiffs will perceive a greater chance that 
summary judgment will be granted. When this chance is sufficiently greater, 
the plaintiff ’s perceived value of litigating will fall enough such that the 
plaintiff might decide not to file suit. To put it more succinctly, if a bit less 
precisely, one expects that plaintiffs would decide not to bring cases that 
they believe they are especially unlikely to win at summary judgment. 
While defendant selection effects add stronger plaintiffs’ cases to the 
summary judgment mix, plaintiff selection effects remove weaker plaintiffs’ 
cases. Similar to defendant selection effects, plaintiff selection effects reduce 
the expected summary judgment disposition rate.  
Finally, there are “settlement selection effects.” These effects occur because 
the two parties’ beliefs concerning the probability that summary judgment 
will be granted move in the same direction. Consider a case that would 
settle before the summary judgment stage under the pre-trilogy standard. 
In this case, settlement occurs because—given the cost of litigating the 
motion and the parties’ beliefs concerning the likelihood each would win if 
the motion were filed—the defendant has more to lose from litigating than 
the plaintiff has to gain.30 On the other hand, if that same case were filed 
after the 1986 trilogy, the defendant will predict a greater chance of winning 
 
29 This is the basic logic of the argument in Issacharoff and Loewenstein, supra note 6, at 105-07. 
30 This is the “divergent expectations” account of litigation, whose formulation dates to John 
P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An 
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); and Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). Under the 
primary alternative explanation, asymmetric information, parties might litigate some cases even 
though settlement would improve both parties’ situations. See generally Steven Shavell, Any 
Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996). Due to space 
constraints, I will not explore the implications of asymmetric information here, but I do not think 
the presence of asymmetric information would change my basic conclusion. 
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at the summary judgment stage and will therefore have less to lose in filing 
the motion. The plaintiff will likewise think the defendant has a greater 
chance of prevailing on summary judgment and will now think she has less 
to gain from litigating.  
If the reduction in the plaintiff’s expected gain from litigating a summary 
judgment motion is greater than the reduction in the defendant’s expected 
loss, then settlement will still occur, though on terms less favorable to the 
plaintiff. On the other hand, if the defendant’s expected loss falls more than 
the plaintiff ’s expected gain falls, pre-summary judgment settlement might 
be impossible to reach post-trilogy.31 Thus, the number of cases in which 
summary judgment motions are filed might increase; this is the effect that 
motivates John Bronsteen’s suggestion that summary judgment actually 
increases the costs of litigation.32 Perhaps less obviously, the same kind of 
argument can be made in the opposite direction, such that cases that would 
not settle pre-trilogy would settle post-trilogy.33 In other words, it is theoret-
ically possible that liberalizing summary judgment practice will reduce the 
amount of trial litigation. 
This analysis shows that settlement selection effects can result in either 
more or fewer cases facing summary judgment litigation. There is no way to 
know a priori whether settlement selection cases are high- or low-quality 
cases in terms of the strength of the plaintiff ’s case, so settlement selection 
effects might cause changes in the composition of cases facing summary 
judgment such that the average quality of cases falls. If so, the presence of 
 
31 Burbank notes in passing the possibility that the trilogy may have led to “vanishing settlements.” 
Burbank, supra note 6, at 617. Gillian Hadfield, meanwhile, reports evidence that “suggests that the 
settlement rate may have been lower in 2000 than it was in 1970.” Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have 
All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing 
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 711-12 (2004). 
32 Bronsteen, supra note 3, at 533. For a noted appellate judge’s view that “enormous resources” 
are expended in the preparation and adjudication of summary judgment motions, see Diane P. 
Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 
232 (2011). For a district court judge’s view that judges spend too much time and energy “dismissing 
cases on summary judgment” and not enough “making litigation just, speedy, and inexpensive,” see 
Mark W. Bennett, Essay, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without 
Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 716-17 (2012–
2013). For another district judge’s critical view of the “tedious” and “time-consuming” nature of 
summary judgment motions, see D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 GREEN 
BAG 2D 273, 273 (2010). 
33 If the parties would not settle before summary judgment under pretrilogy summary judgment 
practice, then we know the defendant must have expected to lose less from litigation than the 
plaintiff expected to gain. If the switch to post-trilogy summary judgment practice caused the 
defendant’s expected loss to fall by less than the fall in the plaintiff ’s expected gain, though, the 
parties might be able to come to a mutually beneficial settlement. 
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settlement selection effects could outweigh the quality-improving effects of 
defendant selection and plaintiff selection. This would cause the summary 
judgment disposition rate to rise, offsetting other types of selection effects.  
As I indicated earlier,34 the idea that changes in summary judgment 
standards can be expected to change parties’ behavior is not entirely novel. 
What previous analyses of the trilogy have failed to appreciate—just as 
early literature failed to appreciate in its analysis of Twombly and Iqbal—is 
the implication of party selection effects for interpreting existing empirical 
evidence. The analysis here shows that the net impact of selection effects 
might either reinforce or counteract any trilogy-induced judicial behavior 
effects. It follows from my analysis that any observed change in the summary 
judgment disposition rate—whether positive, negative, or zero—is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the trilogy tilted the summary judgment terrain 
toward defendants. To my knowledge, this link between the behavioral effects 
of changes in summary judgment standards and the proper interpretation of 
the empirical evidence on summary judgment has not been previously 
analyzed. 
II. JUDGE CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTY BEHAVIOR 
A first question, if a somewhat pedantic one, is whether identifiable 
judge characteristics indicate more sympathy to a particular type of party to 
litigation. By their nature, employment discrimination cases involve allegations 
of discrimination on the basis of membership in a protected class. Parties 
might logically believe that judges’ attitudes toward employment discrimi-
nation might vary according to race, gender, and age, although others argue 
that judges simply “call balls and strikes.”35 Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein, 
and Andrew Martin summarize the large literature concerning the role of 
gender in judging, noting four distinct arguments for why male and female 
judges might decide differently.36 Joshua Fischman discusses a number of 
other studies that posit that appellate judges decide cases differently 
according to race, sex, or ideology as measured by party of appointing 
 
34 See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text. 
35 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr.) (“I will decide every case based on the record, according to the rule of law, without 
fear or favor, to the best of my ability, and I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, 
and not to pitch or bat.”). 
36 Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
389, 391 tbl.1 (2010) (identifying several accounts for why female judges might “behave differently” 
from their male counterparts in a given case). 
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President.37 And consider what now-Justice Sotomayor famously said in 
2002: 
Whether born from experience or inherent physiological or cultural differ-
ences, . . . our gender and national origins may and will make a difference 
in our judging. Justice O’Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise 
old man and wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding 
cases. . . . I am not so sure that I agree with the statement. First, as Professor Martha 
Minnow [sic] has noted, there can never be a universal definition of wise. Second, I 
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male 
who hasn’t lived that life.38 
If parties to litigation believe, like Justice Sotomayor, that a judge’s 
background affects how the judge will adjudicate a given case, then—
regardless of whether such a belief is actually true—the parties’ litigation 
 
37 Joshua B. Fischman, Interpreting Circuit Court Voting Patterns: A Social Interactions Framework, 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25), available at http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/ 
content/early/2013/01/16/jleo.ews042.full.pdf+html. Most research concerning the role of federal 
judge characteristics has involved appellate judges, but there have been several studies of 
associations between civil case outcomes and judge characteristics in the district courts. See, e.g., 
Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case 
Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 281 (1995) (finding that, in three U.S. district courts, “judges 
influence the procedures within civil rights cases but have relatively little effect on whether cases 
settle or win”); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2008) (concluding that “the powerful effects of [ judges’] race and partisanship” 
contribute to how judges allocate liability in cases under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); 
Jennifer A. Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton’s District Court 
Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 145-46 (2000) (finding that “despite their symbolic representation 
of specific societal groups, the behavior of Clinton’s black and female appointees does not support 
the expectations that they actively promote the interests of those groups as they perform the 
duties of their office”); Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal 
Bench: Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 614-15 (1985) (reporting that “[w]ith the 
exception of relatively high government support levels displayed by female judges, there is little to 
distinguish women or black judges as a class from their white, male colleagues”); Kenneth L. 
Manning, ¿Cómo Decide?: Decision-Making by Latino Judges in the Federal Courts 10 (paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Sci. Ass’n, Apr. 14-17, 2004), available at 
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/8/3/3/9/pages83393/p83393-10.php 
(finding that “[i]n criminal justice matters, Latino jurists spoke with a different—and more 
conservative—voice” and that “[t]he same holds true in civil liberties and rights cases”). Authors 
of these studies generally interpret their findings in ways that fail to acknowledge the two-sided 
nature of litigation. In a more recent work, Christina L. Boyd studied four U.S. district courts and 
found that a female judge will “‘settle it’ more often and more quickly than her male colleagues.” 
Christina L. Boyd, She'll Settle It?, 1 J.L. & COURTS 193, 211 (2013). Boyd discusses the possibility 
that party behavior might take judge characteristics into account, but she downplays the possibility 
that both parties consider the judge’s characteristics, rather than just the defendant. Id. at 209.  
38 Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002). 
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strategies can be expected to vary with the identity of the judge assigned to 
their cases. Therefore, one might think that in cases where most summary 
judgment motions are filed by defendants, such as civil rights and tort cases, 
the cases assigned to judges with a defendant-friendly reputation would be 
more likely to be ones in which summary judgment motions are filed. But 
the conceptual framework outlined in Part I implies that this expectation 
can be wrong. Even in civil rights and tort cases, where most summary 
judgment motions are filed by defendants, there will not necessarily be a 
simple relationship between measures of judicial standards and whether a 
summary judgment motion is filed in a case.  
Consider two hypothetical cases in which a woman sues her employer 
for sex discrimination. Case One is assigned to a female judge with a record 
of scrutinizing and rarely granting summary judgment motions filed by the 
defendant in employment-related sex discrimination cases. Case Two is 
assigned to her mirror image—a male judge with a record of liberally 
granting summary judgment to the defendant in sex discrimination cases. In 
which case is it more likely that a party will file for summary judgment? 
The answer is not as simple as it might seem. If plaintiffs and their at-
torneys were just automatons, while defendants and their attorneys behaved 
rationally and self-interestedly, then, of course, we would expect it to be 
more likely that a summary judgment motion would be filed in Case Two. 
But if plaintiffs and their attorneys are real, sentient beings who act in their 
own interests as they discern them, then the Case Two plaintiff can be 
expected to reduce her settlement demand to avoid the risk of summary 
disposition in front of an unsympathetic judge.39 Consequently, when both 
parties are what I have called “live,” even judge characteristics often thought 
to be pro-defendant will not necessarily be associated with a greater rate of 
summary judgment motion filing.  
For clarification, notice what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that the 
Case One defendant would be just as likely to file a summary judgment 
motion as the Case Two defendant, if each case failed to settle before any 
summary judgment motions were due. There is no doubt that the Case Two 
defendant would be more likely to file in this event. The point here is that 
the Case Two plaintiff can be expected to realize her reduced chances of 
 
39 It is also possible that, on learning the judge’s identity, the plaintiff might voluntarily 
dismiss her case under Rule 41. FED. R. CIV. P. 41. Under Rule 41(a)(1)(A), the plaintiff can 
voluntarily dismiss her case and then refile, subject to certain consequences. For example, Rule 
41(d) imposes the costs of the initial action on such a plaintiff, and Rule 41(a)(1)(B) makes any 
later dismissal an adjudication on the merits. 
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succeeding and change her own behavior in order to avoid summary judgment. 
This is the critical analytical point here.  
I turn now to empirical evidence on summary judgment motion filing 
and judge characteristics. 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION FILINGS AND JUDICIAL 
CHARACTERISTICS: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In Section A of this Part, I introduce the docket report data I rely upon 
in my empirical analysis, explain how I constructed this subset of cases, and 
present some basic characteristics of these cases. In Sections B and C, I 
report the empirical results. 
A. Data Construction 
The data relied upon in this Article come from two sources. Data on 
activity in civil cases filed in the U.S. district courts come from Westlaw’s 
database of U.S. district court civil docket reports, commonly known as the 
“DCT” database. The DCT database contains essentially the same docket 
information as PACER. Most important for purposes of this Article, the 
DCT database provides the name of the judge assigned to the case, the U.S. 
district court forum, the nature of the suit, and the text of entries in the 
case’s docket report. The Westlaw DCT data were provided to me in raw 
form, and I wrote computer code to upload them to a relational database 
that allows me to run queries concerning docket activity. For this Article, I 
use data on all docket activity through the end of 2011—at least five years 
(and up to six years) for cases that originated in or were removed to a U.S. 
district court during the 2005 calendar year. Across all types of suits, there 
were 250,774 such cases in my data.40 Of these, 34,475 have a PACER 
“nature of suit” code indicating that they are civil rights actions, and 47,071 
have a code indicating that they are tort actions.  
To determine whether a summary motion judgment was filed in a 
particular case, I queried my database for all cases with a docket entry 
 
40 For comparison’s sake, it is useful to consider fiscal-year data published by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC). According to the Administrative Office, the twelve-
month periods ending March 31, 2005, and March 31, 2006, respectively, saw 278,712 and 244,068 
civil actions filed in the U.S. district courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2006 tbl.C (2006), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2006/tables/C00_Mar_06.pdf. 
A weighted average of these figures, placing a weight of 25% on the fiscal year 2005 number and 
the remaining weight on the fiscal year 2006 number, yields a total of 252,729, which is very close 
to my total. 
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indicating that a party had filed a motion for summary judgment. To do so, 
I searched for docket entries with text beginning with the phrase, “MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,”41 or certain variations.42 I coded all cases 
having a docket description containing such text as ones in which a summary 
judgment motion was filed.  
I then merged my case-level data set with one containing background 
characteristics on judges. This latter data set is from the Federal Judicial 
Center’s (FJC) Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.43 The background 
characteristics included in the directory that I use in this Article are the 
judge’s birth year, race, gender, date on which the judge received his or her 
commission, and name of the President who first nominated the judge.  
The case-to-judge match was complicated somewhat because the name 
provided by Westlaw for the judge assigned to a case does not always match 
that judge’s name as it appears in the FJC Biographical Directory. To 
illustrate this problem, consider a hypothetical judge named “Andrea 
Beatrice Clayton.” This judge’s name could appear in the FJC directory as  
 Andrea Clayton,  
 Andrea Beatrice Clayton,  
 A. Beatrice Clayton,  
 Andrea B. Clayton,  
and so on. Meanwhile, her name might appear in the Westlaw-provided data as  
 JUDGE ANDREA CLAYTON,  
 HONORABLE ANDREA BEATRICE CLAYTON,  
 HON. A. BEATRICE CLAYTON,  
 U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ANDREA B. CLAYTON, 
 U.S. JUDGE DRE CLAYTON,  
 
41 Note that the data provided by Westlaw are in all capital letters. This is a convention I 
have adopted in this Article when referencing the Westlaw data.  
42 Examples of variations include “[X] [Y] MOTION FOR [Z] SUMMARY JUDGMENT,” 
where [X] was allowed to be either empty or any of “SECOND,” “THIRD,” “FOURTH,” 
“FIFTH,” “SIXTH,” “SEVENTH,” “EIGHTH,” “NINTH,” or “TENTH”; [Y] was allowed to 
be either empty or “CROSS”; and [Z] was allowed to be either empty or “PARTIAL.” Because a 
small number of docket descriptions have summary judgment motions entered with the text 
structure “MOTION BY [DEFENDANT/PLAINTIFF] [NAME OF PARTY] FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT,” I did the analogous set of searches using this pattern as well. 
43 History of the Federal Judiciary: Export of All Data in the Biographical Directory of Federal Judg-
es, 1789-Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/export.html 
(last visited May 12, 2014). These data can be downloaded in text format by visiting http://www.fjc.gov/ 
history/export/jb.txt. I last accessed this file for use in this Article on Feb. 28, 2014. 
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and so on.  
To address the potential inconsistencies, I repeatedly merged the case-
level data with the FJC judge-background data, using eleven variants of the 
judge’s name. This procedure achieved matches in 31,695 civil rights cases 
(92%), and in 44,704 tort cases (95%).44 I dropped twenty-one civil rights 
cases and 14,634 tort cases that appeared to involve multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) subject to pretrial activity consolidation under 28 U.S.C § 1407.45 
These deletions left 29,673 civil rights cases and 30,070 tort cases.  
Of the remaining cases, it appeared at least possible that in some circum-
stances the judge listed in the PACER data was assigned the case as a result 
of a reassignment. This is notable because the judge field in the PACER 
data is determined in real time. Consider a simple example in which a case 
commenced on January 2, 2005, was initially assigned to Judge Dredd. A 
docket report pulled on January 2 would list Judge Dredd as the assigned 
judge. At 12:00 AM on July 17, 2005, the case was reassigned to Judge 
Reinhold. A docket report pulled on July 17 or any time thereafter would list 
the assigned judge as Judge Reinhold. Short of searching the docket reports 
directly for judge names, there is no way to discern the originally assigned 
judge’s name when there is a mid-litigation reassignment. Reassignment is 
potentially problematic because, to the extent that the initial judge assign-
ment is done randomly,46 reassignment may undo the exogeneity of judge 
characteristics created by randomization.  
 
44 For some cases, the match failed because PACER’s judge field was either empty or contained 
text indicating that no judge was assigned to the case in question. For others, PACER’s judge field 
identified a magistrate judge rather than an Article III judge. Magistrate judges accounted for the 
bulk of the cases with unmatched judges. 
45 The Westlaw data do not have a variable that positively indicates MDL status. There is a 
“case status” flag variable, but it does not identify all MDL cases. To identify MDL cases, I 
searched the text of all docket entries, selecting those cases that had a docket entry in which the 
string “MDL” appeared. While this MDL screen led me to drop roughly a third of tort cases, and 
while MDL cases of course are of great interest in general, the remaining cases form a coherent 
and interesting collection for the purposes of this study. 
46 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts explains on its website,  
Judge assignment methods vary. . . . By statute, the chief judge of each district court 
has the responsibility to enforce the court’s rules and orders on case assignments. Each 
court has a written plan or system for assigning cases. The majority of courts use some 
variation of a random drawing. One simple method is to rotate the names of available 
judges. At times judges having special expertise can be assigned cases by type, such as 
complex criminal cases, asbestos-related cases, or prisoner cases. . . . Sometimes cases 
may be assigned based on geographical considerations. For example, in a large geographical 
area it may be best to assign a case to a judge located at the site where the case was filed. 
Courts also have a system to check if there is any conflict that would make it improper 
for a judge to preside over a particular case. 
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To determine which cases involved a judicial reassignment, I searched all 
docket entry descriptions for the string “REASSIGNED.” There were 4543 
civil rights cases and 2878 tort cases with this string, which amounts to 
roughly 14% and 10%, respectively, of the otherwise useable cases. These are 
not large fractions, but they are also not trivial. I thus include in the 
estimated models a dummy variable indicating whether a case was reassigned.  
It is a necessary assumption of this paper that reassignments are not 
importantly correlated with unmeasured factors that affect whether a 
summary judgment motion will be filed in a certain case. For example, one 
subset of reassigned cases, which is clearly problematic to include in the 
estimation, involves those assigned to judges who did not receive their 
commissions until after the case’s filing date. It is easiest to see this problem 
with President Obama’s appointees, who by construction cannot have 
assumed the bench until at least 2009. Cases that are assigned to these 
judges at the time the PACER data are pulled must have lasted more than 
three years, and common sense indicates that a greater share of such long-
lasting cases will have summary judgment motions filed than will the full set 
of cases. To avoid this built-in problem, I simply dropped all cases whose 
PACER-named assigned judge received his or her commission after the date 
the case was filed, which eliminated 1241 civil rights cases and 764 tort cases. 
 Table 1 reports the percentages of cases in which a summary judgment 
motion was filed within 2191 days of commencement, which is the maximum 
time horizon allowable to ensure that all cases will have docket entries over 
that period.47 The table’s top row shows that a party filed a summary 
judgment motion in 25.5% of civil rights cases and 10.4% of tort cases.48 The 
third row shows that the rate of summary judgment motion filing was a bit 
lower in cases that were not reassigned. The fifth row shows that, among 
 
Frequently Asked Questions, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited May 12, 2014). 
47 Since I have data on docket entries for all cases through December 31, 2011, and since the 
last date a case could be filed in calendar year 2005 was December 31, 2005, I have data on all cases 
for 2191 days. Note that 2008 was a leap year; therefore, six years from January 1, 2005, equals 2191 
days, rather than 2190 days (6 × 365).  
48 For a study in comparison to these statistics reporting the share of all cases in which a 
summary judgment motion was filed among those cases that terminated in the 2006 fiscal year, see 
Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson (Apr. 
12, 2007, rev. June 15, 2007), available at http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/sujufy06.pdf. This 
memo’s set of cases differs from that represented in Table 1 in a number of ways: Cecil and Cort 
exclude cases from sixteen districts that had not yet fully implemented the CM/ECF system; the 
calendar and fiscal year dates are not the same; and the set of cases terminated in a given period 
generally will have been filed in other years, possibly many years earlier. Nonetheless, the memo 
may be a useful basis for comparison. It reports that the share of terminated cases in which a 
summary judgment motion was filed was 28% for civil rights cases and 9% for tort cases. Id. at 6 tbl.3. 
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reassigned cases, the percentage that had summary judgment motions 
exceeded the non-reassigned cases’ percentage by more than ten percentage 
points, again suggesting the importance of including a dummy variable 
indicating whether the case was reassigned. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Cases with Summary Judgment Motion 
Filed within 2191 Days of Commencement 
 Civil Rights Tort
All Cases 25.5 10.4
Number 30,372 29,305
 
Non-Reassigned Cases 24.2 9.5
Number 26,620 26,925
 
Reassigned Cases  34.8 21.1
Number 3752 2381
B. Summary Data on Judge Characteristics 
Table 2 presents some basic summary statistics concerning the judges 
assigned to the cases studied here.49 The first row shows that the average 
age of a judge assigned to a case in my estimation data is sixty-one for both 
case types. The summary statistics in the table’s second row show that the 
percentages of cases assigned to male judges were 79% and 81% for civil 
rights and tort cases, respectively. The percentages of cases assigned to 
white, non-Hispanic judges were 83% and 86%, and the percentages assigned 
to Hispanic judges were 5% and 4%, respectively.50 In terms of the nominating 
President, 22% and 20% of cases were assigned to judges appointed by 
George W. Bush (Bush II); 38% and 49% were assigned to judges appointed 
 
49 There are six fewer civil rights cases included in this table (N=30,366) than were included 
in Table 1 (N=30,372). This difference is attributable to the presence of six civil rights cases in the 
District of Guam. Because all six of these cases had summary judgment motions filed, the Guam 
district dummy perfectly predicts the outcome in the logit model estimated below. Consequently, 
the logit estimation routine automatically drops these six cases from the sample. I drop these cases 
from the sample described in Table 2 as well, though including them would make no appreciable 
difference in the statistics in question. 
50 The vast majority of cases in the data with a non-white, non-Hispanic judge have an African-
American judge. 
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by Bill Clinton;51 30% and 24% were assigned to judges appointed by either 
George H. W. Bush (Bush I) or Ronald Reagan; 7% and 5% were assigned 
to judges appointed by Jimmy Carter; and the rest were assigned to judges 
appointed by Gerald Ford, Richard Nixon, Lyndon B. Johnson, or John F. 
Kennedy. The listed percentages in some of the appointing-President cells 
are zero due to rounding errors; there are at least a smattering of cases 
assigned to judges appointed by each listed President. 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Judges Assigned to Cases, by Nature of Suit 
Judge Characteristic Civil Rights Tort 
Age at filing date 61 61 
Percentage of cases whose 
judge is:   
Male 79 81 
White 83 86 
Hispanic 5 4 
Percentage whose judge 
appointed by:   
Bush II 22 20 
Clinton 38 49 
Bush I 14 13 
Reagan 16 11 
Carter 7 5 
Ford 1 1 
Nixon 2 2 
Johnson 1 0 
Kennedy 0 0 
Number of cases: 30,366 29,305 
 
51 The 49% figure, which is for tort cases, is the clearest outlier in these characteristics. Presumably 
this figure is explained by systematic reassignment of tort cases, though it is not obvious why so 
many should have been reassigned to Clinton appointees. Note that since I dropped cases that 
appear to involve multidistrict litigation, it is unlikely that this phenomenon is connected to 
asbestos and other mass tort cases, though it is possible that my MDL case-finding algorithm was 
less-than-perfect. 
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C. Estimation Results 
In this Section, I report and discuss the estimated average marginal 
effects of each judge characteristic on the probability that a summary 
judgment motion will be filed in a case within 2191 days. For all but the age 
variable,52 the marginal effect of each characteristic reveals the estimated 
impact on the probability of the filing of a summary judgment motion when 
a case is switched from a judge lacking the given characteristic to one 
possessing that characteristic. For example, consider Judge Smith, a sixty-
one-year-old, female, non-white, non-Hispanic Carter appointee. Consider 
also Judge Jay, who shares all the same characteristics as Judge Smith except 
that he is male. Since all characteristics of these judges are the same except 
for gender, the marginal effect of being assigned to a male judge for cases 
assigned to sixty-one-year-old, non-white, non-Hispanic Carter-appointed 
judges is simply the probability of observing a summary judgment motion 
in a case assigned to Judge Jay minus the same probability in a case assigned 
to Judge Smith.  
To find the average marginal effect of being male across all sets of other 
characteristics, one would calculate the marginal effect of being assigned to 
a male judge for cases assigned to each type of judge in the data and then 
compute the average over all types of judges. For example, this averaging 
would include seventy-two-year-old, white, non-Hispanic Reagan appointees; 
fifty-five-year-old, Hispanic Bush II appointees; and so on. To find the 
average marginal effect of another characteristic—say, of a case being 
assigned to a white judge—we undertake a similar procedure: first, we 
calculate the marginal effect of being assigned to a white judge for each 
judge in the data, holding all characteristics but being white at their actual 
values for that judge, and then we compute the average over all cases of 
these marginal effects.53 In practice, we do not know the exact marginal 
 
52 See infra note 53 for the calculation of the age variable’s marginal effect. 
53 In general, a binary dependent choice model relates the probability that outcome variable 
Y will equal 1 (rather than 0) to a set of K explanatory variables labeled X1, X2, . . . , XK. The logit 
model imposes the mathematical structure that, given that X1=x1, X2=x2, . . . XK=xK, this 
probability may be written 
	
| , , …
∑
∑ 		
,
	
where the set of coefficients {β1, β2, . . ., βK} is the object of estimation. With the exception of 
judge’s age, all X variables in this paper are dummy variables, so that they are binary: either xj=0 
or xj=1. The marginal effect of binary variable Xj  on the probability that Y=1, given the values of all 
the other variables, is  
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effect for each type of judge—that is why we have to estimate a model such 
as logit. 
In Table 3, I report estimates of the marginal effects for cases involving 
civil rights and torts.54 All models include dummy variables indicating the 
district in which the action occurred as well as whether the case appeared to 
have been reassigned to a new judge, though the estimated marginal effects 
for these variables are not displayed. For reference, the top row of the table 
reports the share of cases of each type in which a motion for summary 
judgment was filed within 231 days of commencement. The bottom row 
reports p-values testing the null hypothesis that all judge-characteristic 
marginal effects are simultaneously zero.55  
All other cells in the table report the estimated average marginal effect 
for various judge characteristics, together with estimated standard errors.56 
Estimated marginal effects that are statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
but not the 0.05 level are denoted by one asterisk (*). Those that are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level but not the 0.01 level are denoted by 
 
 Δ X , X~ x~ X , X~ x~ ,  
where the notation “ ~ ~ ” indicates that the values of all variables other than Xj are given by 
the vector x~j. To estimate X , one does the following: (i) set Xj=1 and set X~j=x~j; (ii) use the 
estimated values of the β coefficients and the formula for P(Y=1|X=x) to estimate the probability 
that Y=1 given these values; (iii) set Xj=0 and again set X~j=x~j; (iv) again, use the estimated values 
of the β coefficients and the formula for P(Y=1|X=x) to estimate the probability that Y=1; and (v) 
subtract the estimated probability calculated in step (iv) from the estimate calculated in step (ii). 
The difference calculated in step (v) is the estimated marginal effect of binary characteristic Xj; 
this estimate has various desirable statistical properties.  
For a judge’s age, which is treated as a continuous variable, one finds the marginal effect by 
differentiating the conditional probability function in the first equation above with respect to the 
age variable. It can be shown that the logit marginal effect for a continuous variable equals the 
product of the variable’s β coefficient times the product of (a) the estimated probability that Y=1 
given X and (b) the estimated probability that Y=0 given X, so that the marginal effect for age is 
, where  is the estimated probability in (a). 
54 The number of observations used in each model differs modestly from the numbers Table 
1, because in some districts, a summary judgment motion was filed either in all or none of the 
cases. Since this situation prevents estimation of the district-level dummy variable’s coefficient, 
observations from such districts are dropped automatically during estimation of the logit model. 
For example, there were six civil rights cases filed in the District Court of Guam that had to be 
dropped, because there was no variation in the outcome variable for these cases. See also supra note 
49. 
55 The p-values are based on Wald tests of the null hypothesis that all judge-related coeffi-
cients are truly zero, against the alternative hypothesis that they are non-zero. See WILLIAM H. 
GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 785-87 (6th ed. 2008) (discussing the Wald statistic and 
stating that it has a limiting chi-squared distribution); id. at 993-95 (discussing the chi-squared 
distribution). 
56 Estimated standard errors are computed as the square root of the estimated variance for 
each marginal effect calculated using the delta method, which is the conventional way to estimate 
the variance of nonlinear functions of consistent estimators. Id. at 1055-56. 
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two asterisks (**). Those that are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or 
lower are denoted by three asterisks (***). Because each reported marginal 
effect indicates an impact on the probability of an outcome’s occurrence, the 
marginal effects can be converted to percentages by multiplying by 100. It is 
important to understand that for the appointing President variables, Carter 
appointees serve as the omitted category. This means that the figures 
reported in the table for these variables tell us the estimated average impact 
of switching from a Carter appointee to a judge appointed by another 
President. 
For civil rights cases, a number of the coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant. Assignment of a case to either a white, non-Hispanic judge or to 
an Hispanic judge is associated with an increase in the probability of the 
filing of a summary judgment motion by 3.1 and 3.4 percentage points, 
respectively. These effects amount to 12% to 13% of the overall percentage of 
civil rights cases with summary judgment motions, which is 25.5%. Assign-
ment of a case to a Bush II, Clinton, or Bush I appointee is associated with 
an increase in the probability of the filing of a summary judgment motion 
by 4.3 or 4.4 percentage points—a 17% increase relative to the overall 
percentage of cases with summary judgment motions. Assignment to a 
Reagan appointee is associated with a slightly smaller increase of 3.6 
percentage points, and assignment to a Johnson appointee (of whom very 
few are represented in the data) increases the probability of the filing of a 
summary judgment motion in a case by a very large 10.4 percentage points. 
Finally, observe that the p-value testing the null hypothesis that all judge 
characteristics are irrelevant is zero to three decimal digits, so this hypothe-
sis is overwhelmingly rejected.57 
For tort cases, there is much less to say. The p-value testing that all char-
acteristics’ marginal effects are zero fails to reject the null hypothesis. Only 
the Bush II effect is even marginally statistically significant. It suggests a 3.7 
 
57 Because home-state senators have considerable influence on the selection of district court 
nominees, one might think that the nominating President would fail to measure judicial ideology. 
Stephen B. Burbank, Politics, Privilege & Power: The Senate’s Role in the Appointment of Federal 
Judges, 86 JUDICATURE 24, 26 (2002). To address this possibility, I supplemented my data using a 
judicial ideology variable provided by Christina Boyd on her website. See Christina L. Boyd, 
Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data (June 15, 2010), http://clboyd.net/ideology.html (providing 
data that take into account partisan information about both the nominating President and senators 
in a given judge’s state). For further details on an empirical methodology for testing the hypotheses 
of positive political theory on justices, judges, and courts, see generally Lee Epstein et al., The 
Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). When I re-estimated my model for 
civil rights cases with the ideology score included, it had virtually no association with summary 
judgment motion filing. While it did reduce the precision of my marginal effects estimates, my 
basic qualitative conclusions continue to hold. 
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percentage point reduction in the probability of the filing of a summary 
judgment motion, which is very large relative to the 10.4% of all tort cases 
in which summary judgment motions are filed.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 When I modified the torts model to include the ideology score variable, this variable was 
statistically insignificant. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The model that includes this 
variable yields statistically significant and sizable negative marginal effects for the two Bush 
Presidents, with no other variables having individually significant marginal effects, though the 
p-value testing exclusion of all characteristics is now 0.04, low enough to reject this exclusion. 
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Table 3: Logit Marginal Effects for Cases Involving Civil Rights and Torts 
 Civil Rights Tort
Motion filed within 2191 days 
of commencement 
0.255 0.104 
Male judge 0.001 0.002
 (0.007) (0.016)
White judge 0.031*** -0.024
 (0.012) (0.021)
Hispanic judge 0.034** -0.017
 (0.017) (0.021)
Judge’s age 0.003 -0.019
 (0.007) (0.015)
Bush II 0.043** -0.037*
 (0.021) (0.023)
Clinton 0.043** -0.05
 (0.017) (0.032)
Bush I 0.044** -0.034
 (0.019) (0.023)
Reagan 0.036* -0.007
 (0.019) (0.016)
Carter Omitted Omitted
 N/A N/A
Ford -0.002 -0.023
 (0.042) (0.029)
Nixon 0.068 0.019
 (0.046) (0.025)
Johnson 0.104* 0.04
 (0.041) (0.041)
Kennedy 0.026 -0.016
 (0.044) (0.070)
p-value 0.000*** 0.157
 
Note: Estimated standard errors appear in parentheses. 
* Denotes estimated marginal effects that are statistically significant at the 
0.10 level but not the 0.05 level. 
** Denotes estimated marginal effects that are statistically significant at the 
0.05 level but not the 0.01 level. 
*** Denotes estimated marginal effects that are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level or lower.     
  
2014] Rethinking Summary Judgment Empirics 1687 
 
 What do we learn from these estimates? First, the overwhelming statistical 
significance of the pattern of results of civil rights cases clearly rejects the 
possibility that parties are indifferent to judge characteristics. Second, the 
pattern of civil rights cases results defies any simple, only-defendants-
respond story for summary judgment behavior. Standard theories of the 
roles of gender, race, and ethnicity would strain to explain why cases 
assigned to male and female judges exhibit no difference in the summary 
judgment motion filing rate, while those assigned to non-Hispanic whites 
and to Hispanics are both more likely to be ones in which summary judgment 
motions are filed than those assigned to non-white, non-Hispanic judges. 
And the results for the appointing President are also difficult to comprehend 
under a simple, one-party-only story: Why does summary judgment filing 
in cases assigned to Clinton appointees look just like filing in those assigned 
to appointees of either of the Bushes? The answer cannot be that all such 
variables indicating positive marginal effects are for Presidents elected after 
the trilogy, because the marginal effect for Johnson appointees is large and 
statistically significant (likewise, the effect for Nixon appointees is large and 
positive, if statistically insignificant). 
In sum, the estimation results suggest that judge characteristics are likely 
significant determinants of whether a litigant will file a motion for summary 
judgment in a civil rights case, but the pattern of effects does not reflect 
predictions attributed to a unilateral model of defendant party behavior. 
Nor would the general absence of significant effects for tort cases—except 
for the reduction in the probability that a summary judgment motion is filed 
for Bush II appointees—square with such a unilateral model. 
CONCLUSION 
The arguments and evidence in this Article have important implications, 
both for conducting empirical research concerning litigation and for drawing 
policy conclusions based on that research.  
The empirical evidence in Part III shows that simple stories involving 
either no behavioral response by any party or unilateral defendant responses 
to post-trilogy changes in summary judgment standards are not supported 
by the data. Previous research shows that defendants file the vast majority 
of summary judgment motions in both civil rights and tort cases. Yet the 
filing of summary judgment motions in such cases does not generally track 
predictions that claim we will more often see defendants filing motions 
when the judge assigned to a case is more favorable to defendants. My 
analysis in Part II suggests a simple explanation for this finding: at least 
some plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ attorneys understand that when they draw an 
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unfavorable judge assignment, avoiding the threat of adverse summary 
judgment adjudication will require them to revise their demands and accept 
less in settlement. While I have not yet worked out all of the details of a 
model of settlement in a sequential model that allows summary judgment, it 
is easy to see that perceived increases in the probability that a judge will 
grant a defendant’s summary judgment motion can lead to complicated 
patterns of change in the set of cases facing summary judgment motions.  
Given all this, one normative issue arises with regard to what researchers 
should and should not do when trying to assess the effects of apparent 
changes in legal rules. What they should not do is simply compute the 
plaintiff win rate before and after a hypothesized change in legal rules and 
then treat the observed difference as illustrating whether the rule change 
favored plaintiffs or defendants. When party behavior might change the 
composition of cases adjudicated under the standard of interest, such 
comparisons risk comparing apples to oranges.  
On this point, I note that Daniel Klerman and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee have 
recently argued that things might not be quite as dire as I suggest.59 Klerman 
and Lee show that in simple, one-shot economic models of litigation based 
on both divergent expectations and asymmetric information, there are 
assumptions about the distribution of case quality and party beliefs such that 
one can use changes in the plaintiff win rate to draw inferences concerning 
changes in legal rules.60 However, my own work in progress shows, by direct 
example construction, that the set of possible results in such models includes 
essentially anything: a pro-defendant change in legal rules can cause the 
plaintiff win rate to rise, fall, or even stay the same.61 While Klerman and 
Lee’s findings and my own results might appear incompatible, they are not. 
Together, the two papers illustrate the important role that assumptions 
about litigants’ behavior play in making sense of empirical information 
concerning who wins in litigation.62 In brief, the takeaway from my work 
thus far is that attempts to draw assumption-free inferences about changes 
 
59 See generally Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases (Mar. 
17, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/abstract=2406178.  
60 Id. at 25-29. 
61 See Jonah B. Gelbach, Everything You Need to Know about Litigation Selection and 
the Plaintiff ’s Win Rate in One Simple Graph 31 (June 2, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (employing a graphical representation of litigation models and pointing out that 
the “tight relationship between the decision standard and the plaintiff’s win rate” requires specific 
assumptions and does not hold generally).  
62 For an additional explanation of how assumptions about litigants’ behavior can affect em-
pirical data, see generally Jonah B. Gelbach, Can the Dark Arts of the Dismal Science Shed Light on the 
Empirical Reality of Civil Procedure?, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2409778.  
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in legal rules from data regarding changes in win rates are doomed to fail. 
The takeaway from Klerman and Lee’s work is that there can be an epistemic 
payoff to making behavioral assumptions. The question of whether the 
assumptions necessary to collect that payoff can be stomached is an important 
one, although not within the scope of this Article.  
But the normative implications of these methodological issues for the 
debate over summary judgment doctrine and policy is simple. Without 
some strong behavioral assumptions, the received empirical facts concerning 
summary judgment do not establish the absence of a genuine dispute about 
the impact of the trilogy. Researchers, judges, and the federal rulemakers 
should recognize that more than the existing evidence will be needed to 
dispose of the hypothesis that the trilogy, in particular, had an important 
impact on litigation, or that summary judgment practice, in general, has 
changed in ways that erode plaintiffs’ access to justice in meritorious cases. 
A failure of the summary judgment disposition rate to rise in employment 
discrimination cases, for example, is entirely consistent with the proposition 
that the trilogy has led judges to tighten the screws on plaintiffs in these 
cases at summary judgment. 
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the quantitative empirical evi-
dence shows that such a change has actually occurred. I claim only that, 
given the absence of careful consideration of changes in party behavior, the 
data we have simply cannot tell us. As a general matter, we need more 
detailed models, more detailed empirical evidence, or—more likely—both.  
